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Technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in emerging economies are considered to 
be the most important channel through which Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) influence the host 
economy.  Empirical  evidence  about  the  existence,  magnitude  and  direction  of  FDI-related 
spillovers  in  these  countries  is  contradictory  pointing  to  the  necessity  of  conducting  more 
econometric studies using firm-level data. We conduct an econometric analysis to assess  the 
impact of FDI-related horizontal technology spillovers on output growth of domestic firms in the 
Turkish manufacturing industry over 2003-2006. When a broad definition of foreign ownership is 
adopted, our findings suggest that horizontal spillovers occur from foreign to local firms in the 
sector of activity. Export-oriented firms do not benefit from these spillovers in contrast to firms 
producing  mainly  for  the  domestic  market.  However,  when  foreign  ownership  is  defined 
according  to  whether  the  minority  or  majority  of  capital  is  detained  by  the  foreign  partner, 
horizontal spillovers seem to originate from foreign firms with majority or full foreign ownership 
while no such effect is associated with minority-owned foreign firms. 
 
Keywords:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI),  multinational  corporations,  foreign  ownership,  productivity, 
technology spillovers, knowledge spillovers, horizontal spillovers, Turkey. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows have increased significantly worldwide 
and at the same time the share of these flows going into developing countries has followed an 
upward trend. By the year 2008, developing countries constituted the destination of the one third 
of total FDI flows and the amount involved reached 600 billion US dollars (see Figure 1). A 
small yet increasing part of these FDI flows towards developing countries also led multinational 
firms to conduct R&D activities therein (UNCTAD 2005). 
FDI  may  affect  the  economy  of  a  host  country  through  its  impact  on  employment  creation, 
foreign exchange earnings, capital accumulation and by the usage of more advanced equipment 
and  technology.  However,  it  has  been  pointed  out  recently  that  the  most  important  channel 
through which FDI may impact on developing economies is situated on the technology side. 
Indeed, the major contribution of FDI to a developing economy consists in fostering technology 
transfer  by  bringing  and  diffusing  new  technologies,  knowledge,  and  skills  to  the  recipient 
country. The transfer of the intangible from foreign to local firms is referred to as “FDI-based 
technology  or  knowledge  spillovers”.  These  spillovers  can  be  horizontal  (intra-industry)  or 
vertical spillovers (inter-industry) depending whether they are disseminated within or outside the 
sector of activity of foreign firms that trigger these spillovers. 
After pursuing inward-oriented economic policies based on an import-substitution development 
strategy implemented through Five-Year Development Plans since the 1960s, Turkey switched to 
outward-oriented policies  after a severe balance of payment  crisis  in  the early 1980s.  These 
policies  consisted  mainly  in  removing  gradually  import  quotas  and  custom  duties,  attracting 
foreign investment, promoting exports, minimizing state intervention and liberalizing  4 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of FDI flows: 1980-2008 (trillion dollars) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2010). 
 
international capital flows, which occurred in 1989. The signature of a Customs Union agreement 
with the European Union in 1995 contributed to a further liberalization of its economy. 
The first law on foreign capital was enacted in 1954. Although this law was initiated with the 
intention of providing a more attractive environment for foreign investors, due to the restrictive 
measures  it  entailed
3,  it  served  the  initial  purpose only  partially.  From  1950  to  1980  the 
cumulative authorized FDI had reached only $229 million (Öniş, 1994). Other reasons that have 
contributed to the relatively poor FDI performance in Turkey are red tape (Erdilek, 1982) and 
more generally the negative attitude of policy makers operating under  an import substitution 
industrialization strategy. After the government  initiated a stabilization program  in  1980  that 
paved the way to an open economy, the legislative background was also reorganized to eliminate 
favoritism among foreign investors, local content requirements, minimum export requirements 
and restrictions on transfer of capital and profits (Erdilek, 1986; Akpınar, 2001).  
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In addition to changes in the regulatory framework, privatization of state economic enterprises, 
liberalization  of  the  financial  system,  elimination  of  restrictions  on  foreign  exchange, 
establishment of a stock exchange and heavy investment in telecommunications technology all 
contributed  to  the  development  of  a  favorable  environment  for  FDI  throughout  the  1980s. 
However, in  the following decade, two major economic crises  in  1994 and 1999 as  well as 
reliance on short term capital flows resulted in a relatively poor FDI performance. When we look 
at the 2000s, we see a much more favorable environment for foreign investors with a strongly 
regulated financial system, a low inflation rate and the establishment of a Coordination Council 
for the Improvement of the Investment Climate. Following the enactment of the new foreign 
capital  law  in  June  2003,  minimum  capital  requirements  and  permits  were  eliminated;  the 
ownership of property by foreigners without any restrictions, the right to international arbitration 
and employment of expatriates were granted. Partly as a result of these measures a sharp rise 
occurred in FDI from 0.71 % of GDP in 2003 to 5% in 2005 which was followed by a fall after 
2006 (Figure 3). 
Note that efforts to open up the Turkish economy were not enough initially to attract more FDI. 
Until the year 2000, annual FDI flows to Turkey were rather low (below US$ 1 billion) compared 
to other emerging economies (UNCTAD, 2005). Total cumulative net FDI inflows were nearly 
US$ 9.7 billion between 1974 and 1999, corresponding to an annual average of US$ 370 million. 
From 2000 onwards there has been an important increase in the FDI flows (annual average of 
US$ 9 billion between 2000 and 2008) especially after the Turkish government has started to 
liberalize its investment policy. As illustrated in Figure 2, FDI inflows peaked in 2007. 
 
In this chapter, our objective is to examine whether the rapid increase in FDI flows since the year 
2000 impacted on the productivity of Turkish manufacturing firms through materialization of 









Figure 3: Evolution of the FDI/GDP ratio in Turkey: 1998-2008 (%) 
 
 
since available studies on this issue for the Turkish economy all concern the pre-2001 period 
whereas our dataset covers the more recent 2003-2006 period
4. In the remaining part  of this 
study, we first examine the theory behind the existence and the impact of FDI-related technology 
spillovers in developing countries. In the third section, the dataset and the model used as well as 
the econometric estimation method  adopted are explained. The fourth section is devoted  to the 
analysis of econometric findings while the last section  recapitulates and suggests some further 
research avenues. 
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2.  FDI-related technology or knowledge spillovers in developing countries
5 
 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) prefer to set up affiliates overseas rather than export directly 
or license their product or technology due, inter alia, to problems encountered in protecting their 
proprietary knowledge. Thus TNCs internalize certain transactions to protect their brand names, 
technology, and marketing advantages. Although TNCs wish to retain technology internally or to 
charge a market price for transfers to third parties, positive externalities in the form of technology 
spillovers  may be  created. This  transfer  and diffusion of technology is  one of the important 
contributions of FDI to the host country. A TNC brings its production technology, its access to 
global production and distribution networks, and its know-how and experience by investing in the 
host  country.  The  diffusion  of  technology  may  lead  to  improvements  in  the  productivity  of 
domestic firms in ways that do not allow the TNC to capture all the related benefits. 
The technology transfer triggered by TNCs toward developing countries may affect directly or 
indirectly the productivity level of the host country. The direct effect is located in the foreign 
firms that invest abroad: it may occur either through import of machinery or through know-how, 
knowledge and licenses -or both-and impact positively on the productivity levels of foreign firms, 
hence on the aggregate productivity level of the host country. In other terms, the direct effect 
consists in newly established foreign firms recording a higher productivity level than in their 
domestic counterparts, a situation that leads to an increase in the overall productivity level in the 
host country.  
The indirect effects of FDI are exerted on domestic firms and may lead to an increase in their 
productivity level or an improvement in the quality of their products, or both. The indirect effects 
represent a kind of unintended technology transfers occurring form foreign to domestic firms. 
These  technology  spillovers  related  with  FDI  are  classified  in  three  categories:  horizontal, 
vertical and labour spillovers
6. Horizontal spillovers are spillovers from foreign to domestic firms 
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operating in the same industry or in the same region, while vertical spillovers are defined as 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms operating in vertically-related industries, either from 
foreign suppliers to domestic users (forward linkages) or from foreign users to domestic suppliers 
(backward linkages)
7. Spillovers through employment by domestic firms of workers who worked 
previously for foreign firms are called labour spillovers. These three types of spillovers can occur 
mainly through the following  channels: demonstration/imitation,  labour mobility, competition, 
and backward and forward linkages with domestic firms. 
Demonstration/imitation effects: According to Blomstr￶m and Kokko (1998), as TNC affiliates 
become major players in the domestic market, domestic firms will be forced to adopt newer and 
more advanced technologies and use the existing resources of the firm more efficiently in order to 
survive
8. Spillovers may take place when domestic firms improve their efficiency by copying 
technologies of foreign affiliates operating in the domestic market via  the observation channel. 
Either demonstration of TNCs or imitation by domestic firms is the most evident spillover  
channel according to  Das  (1987) and Wang  &Blomstr￶m (1992). After the observation of a 
product innovation or a new form of organization adapted to local conditions, local entrepreneurs 
may attempt to imitate the innovation. The introduction of a new technology into a given market 
may be too expensive and risky for a domestic firm to undertake, due to the costs inherent in 
acquiring its knowledge and the uncertainty of the results that may be obtained. However, as 
domestic firms interact with existing technology users; this interaction reduces their innovation 
and imitation costs. Thus, information is diffused, uncertainty is reduced, and imitation levels 
increase,  leading  finally  to  an  improvement  in  total  factor  productivity
9.  Imitation  of  the 
technology either by reverse engineering or any other way works mainly among firms within 
same industries and referred as intra-industry spillovers. 
 
Labour mobility: The second channel is related to the possibility of hiring workers previously 
employed in TMCs and who have knowledge and experience of the technology and who are able 
                                                           
7 These spillovers will not be analyzed here: see Javorcik (2004) and Saggi (2005). 
8  Either because they operate on an inefficient scale; that is, there  exists idle resources which are not used in 
production process in the firm, or because they produce their output with inefficient combinations of inputs. 
9 Helpman (1999). 9 
 
to  apply  this  in  that  firm  by  domestic  firms
10. Domestic  firms‟  internalization  of  improved 
management  practices  and  organizational  efficiency  of  TNCs  is  expected  to  be  the  result  of 
training of local employees in TNCs
11. Even supporting staff acquires skills, attitudes and ideas 
on the job through exposure to  modern organization forms and international quality standards. 
These people make a significant contribution by raising productivity when working for domestic 
firms or when setting up new entrepreneurial businesses. The productivity improvements caused 
by the movement of labour from TNCs to other existing or new domestic firms are realized 
through two mechanisms: through direct spillover to workers engaged in the same type of job and 
through knowledge carried by workers who move to another firm.  
Nevertheless, a possible negative impact  might arise through this channel, as TNCs may attract 
the best workers away from domestic firms by offering higher wages and leaving them with less-
skilled employees
12. The market-stealing effect and the skill-stealing effect could be large enough 
to offset the positive effect of FDI. Also, the influence of labour mobility on the efficiency of 
domestic firms is difficult to evaluate, as it involves tracking the workers in order to investigate 
their impact on the productivity of other workers
13. For this reason, if TNCs and domestic firms 
compete in the same  labor  market, domestic firms may have to pay higher wages to attract 
workers. 
 
Competition: When TNCs decide to penetrate a new market directly through investing in the 
country, they tend to bring with them more sophisticated technology and superior managerial 
practice enabling them to compete with domestic firms who tend to be more familiar with the 
consumer preferences and business practices in the local market
14. Since FDI promotes efficiency 
through the economy by increasing competition in domestic industries, an increased competition 
induced by TNCs becomes the third channel of spillovers from FDI
15. Technology advances due 
to increased competition may involve both intra- and inter-industries spillovers. Competition with 
TNCs may force domestic firm s to increase their competitiveness  by reforming management 
                                                           
10 Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass & Saggi (2002). 
11Globerman (1979). 
12 Girma et al. (2001) and Sinani & Meyer, (2004). 
13 Saggi (2002). 
14 Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999). 
15 Markusen & Venables (1999) and Wang &Blomstr￶m (1992). 10 
 
styles and updating production technology. While competition between TNCs and domestic firms 
in the domestic economy is an incentive for the domestic firms to make a more efficient use of 
existing resources and technology or even to adopt new technologies, on the other hand, it may 
restrict the market power of domestic firms.  
The efficiency of domestic firms may also be negatively affected through this channel, if foreign 
firms with advanced technologies produce at a lower marginal cost. By taking market share from 
domestic firms and forcing them to operate on a less efficient scale, with a consequent increase of 
their average costs, TNCs may lower the productivity of domestic firms as indicated in Aitken 
and Harrison (1999). However, domestic firms may also react to foreign competition by using the 




3.  Data, model and econometric estimation 
 
3a) Data  
Enterprise-level  data  used  in  this  study  come  from  the  Structural  Business  Statistics  Survey 
(SBSS) conducted by the Turkish  Statistical  Institute (Turkstat) on an annual  basis
17.  In our 
dataset, the number of observations  for each year varies from 77,000 (2003) to 85,000 (2006). 
The statistical unit or the unit of analysis used in the SBSS is the “enterprise” defined as “… an 
organizational form that produces goods and services using decision autonomy at first degree. 
An  enterprise  carries  out  one  or  more  activities  at  one  or  more  locations”  and  all  data  are 
collected at the enterprise level
18. The classification of the enterprises‟ main activities is done in 
accordance with the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community 
NACE Rev.1.1. All the enterprises with 20 or more employees are surveyed while those with less 
than 20 employees are selected on a sampling basis. 
 
                                                           
16 Blomstr￶m and Kokko (1998). 
17 More information about the dataset is available on TurkStat web page at www.tuik.gov.tr.We were able to use this 
database thanks to the official authorization granted by and through a protocol signed with the TurkStat. 
18 We will use the terms „firm” and “enterprise” interchangeably in the sequel. 11 
 
The dataset contains firm-specific information on variables such as the number of employees, 
commercial  revenue,  turnover,  capital  ownership  structure  (local,  foreign,  public),  values  of 
material and energy inputs, gross fixed investment, changes in stocks, export and import values 
of  the  firm.  The  data  is  available  over  the  period  2003-2006.  In  this  study,  the  focus  is  on 
manufacturing firms defined as those units that are part of the NACE 1.1 sectors ranging from 15 
to 37 at the two-digit level, and taking into account only manufacturing firms reduces naturally 
the number of observations. In addition, we use only private establishments with 20 or more 
employees,  and  the  number  of  observations  is  further  reduced  by  data  cleaning  and 
transformation procedures
19. The final dataset is an unbalanced firm-level panel data  with 192 
four-digit  level  manufacturing  industries  over  the  period  2003 -2006.  The  total  number  of 
observations is 30,178 for the whole sample. Foreign firms are defined as those firms where the 
share of foreign agents in equity equals  at least 10%
20. According to this definition,  there are 
1,489 observations for foreign-owned firms, i.e. about  5% of  all observations,  and 28,689 
observations for  domestic firms in our dataset over the period 200 3-2006. Distribution of  the 
number of firms at the two-digit NACE level is presented for 2006 in Table 1. Indicators on the 
presence of foreign firms in the Turkish manufacturing sector are presented in  Figure 4 for a 
number of two-digit NACE sectors. These indicators are the share of foreign firms in the number 
of firms, in total employment, in total gross  output and in total  value added at the two-digit 
NACE level
21. Note that data presented in Figure 4 refer to average values of each variable over 
the period 2003-2006.  
First, Figure 4 indicates that in spite of the low number of foreign firms operating in the Turkish 
manufacturing sector (on average 6% for the whole manufacturing sector over the period 2003 -
2006), these firms control almost 25% of the Turkish manufacturing sector‟s gross output and 
value added, and 15% of its labor force. For instance, foreign firms in the motor vehicles sector 
employ 55% of the labor, and produce nearly 80% of the gross output and 73% of the value 
added. In the chemical products sector the foreign share in sector-level employment attains 39% 
                                                           
19 More details on the cleaning procedure used are available from the authors upon request. 
20We take 10% foreign share in accordance with the OECD and the IMF‟s definitions. See also Javorcik (2004).  
21Data on tobacco, leather products, petroleum products and  office machinery and computers are not included in 
Figure 4 since the total number of the firms in these sectors is less than ten. 12 
 
Table 1: Sector-level distribution of the number of firms according to ownership structure (2006) 
15 Food products  758 46 804 5.72
16 Tobacco 4 5 9 55.56
17 Textiles 1155 16 1171 1.37
18 Wearing apparel 992 26 1018 2.55
19 Leather products 169 0 169 0
20 Wood products 105 2 107 1.87
21 Paper products 152 15 167 8.98
22 Publishing and printing  146 3 149 2.01
23 Petroleum products 8 1 9 11.11
24 Chemicals products 218 58 276 21.01
25 Rubber and plastic products 406 24 430 5.58
26 Other non-metallic mineral prod. 474 20 494 4.05
27 Basic metals 277 13 290 4.48
28 Fabricated metal products 473 20 493 4.06
29 Machinery and equipment 583 25 608 4.11
30 Office machinery and computers 5 0 5 0
31 Electrical machinery  212 17 229 7.42
32 Radio, television and comm. 41 2 43 4.65
33 Medical  instruments 59 6 65 9.23
34 Motor vehicles 234 48 282 17.02
35 Other transport equipment 75 6 81 7.41
36 Furniture 347 18 365 4.93













                                                  Source: Authors‟ calculations from TurkStat‟s SBSS database. 
 
Figure 4: Average share of foreign firms in sector-level variables over 2003-2006* 
 
* for NACE codes used on the horizontal axis, see Table 1. 13 
 
 
and in gross output and valued added amounts nearly to 48% and 50%, respectively. Also foreign 
firms in the radio, television and communication sector employ 35% of the labor, and produce 
nearly 51% of the gross output and 53% of the value added. The difference between the share of 
foreign firms in gross output or value added and their share in employment at the sector level 
point to  the fact  that foreign firms  use more capital-intensive production methods  than their 
domestic counterparts. 
 
Secondly, although we have not presented data on this issue, productivity level of foreign firms is 
larger than that of domestic firms in most of the two-digit NACE sectors
22. Hence, these firms 
produce more efficiently than local firms and this   is explained  mostly  by the  capital-  and 
technology-intensive  production  methods  of  the  foreign  firms ,  which  reflect  in  turn  their 
possession and control of intangible proprietary assets. The productivity gap between foreign and 
domestic firms points to the possibility of knowledge spillovers toward the second category of 
firms.  
 
Finally, data presented above point to the important role foreign firms play role in the evolution 
of economic activity in the Turkish manufacturing sector and therefore justify the aim of the 




In  order  to  examine  the  impact  of  FDI-related  horizontal  technology  spillovers  on  the 
productivity of local  firms, we  adopt  a production  function framework  similar  to  the one in 
Javorcik (2004). In equation (1), Y stands for real gross output and factors of production included 
are physical capital stock (K), number of employees (L), intermediate materials (M) and energy 
inputs including fuel and electricity (E). A is a scale factor measuring the contribution of total 
factor productivity to gross output.  
                                                           
22 On this issue over the period 1983-2001, see Pamukçu & Taymaz (2009) and Taymaz et al. (2010). 14 
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      (2) 
where the indices i, j and t denote firm i operating in sector j at time t, respectively. 
 
The non-input variables included in equation (2) will be defined and discussed below. Here it 
suffices to say that they capture the contribution of these variables to total factor productivity 
(measured by the term ln A after the logarithms are taken). Note that all monetary variables are 




Gross output and input variables 
 
Real output (Yijt) has been calculated as production value deflated by the producer price indexes 
(PPI)
 at the four-digit NACE level. Capital stock (Kijt) is measured by the value of depreciation 
and depletion allowances of firms since no data on the book value of capital stock is available in 
our data set. This indicator is deflated by the fixed-capital investment deflator at the two digit 
level for the private manufacturing sector. Labor (Lijt) is measured by the number of employees 
of the firm. Material input variable (Mijt) is constructed as the sum of purchases of intermediate 
inputs except electricity and fuel. It is deflated by a composite input price index constructed for 
each two-digit NACE sector on the basis of the input-output matrix of the year 2002. In the 
calculation of the sector indexes,  we take the six  most important  input coefficients  for each 
sector.  The  PPI  for the relevant  two-digit NACE sectors is used  for  deflation.  Energy  input 
variable (Eijt) is the sum of electricity and fuel expenses (LPG, natural gas, coal, gasoline, diesel 15 
 
oil, heat, steam, hot water etc.). Both electricity and fuel expenses are deflated by an appropriate 
two-digit sector PPI. 
 
Indicator of horizontal FDI-related technology spillovers 
 
The indicator of FDI-related horizontal spillovers is constructed as the ratio of foreign equity 
share-weighted output
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This variable captures the extent of foreign presence in sector j at time t  and is introduced in 
equation (2) to measure the extent of horizontal FDI-related technology spillovers
24. The value of 
this variable increases proportionally with the output of the foreign firm and the share of foreign 
capital in these  firms.  A positive  or negative  and  statistically  significant coefficient on th is 
variable points to the existence of horizontal knowledge and technology spillovers from foreign 
to domestic firms (through demonstration effects, competition effects and labor turnover) This 
proxy is also time-varying and sector specific variable
25. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the FDI-related horizontal technology spillovers variable are presented 
in Table 2.  Its average value is comprised between 11.78 % in 2005 a nd 12.44 % in 2004. 
However, its maximum value attains 75.69 % in 2006.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for the horizontal technology spillovers indicator (%) 
Year Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
2003 7514 12.20 11.73 0 74.83
2004 7700 12.44 11.99 0 52.01
2005 7700 11.78 11.27 0 53.88
2006 7264 12.41 12.17 0 75.69  
Source: Authors’ calculations from the SBSS database 
 
                                                           
23 A similar definition is used by Javorcik (2004), Blalock (2001) and Schoors and van der Tol (2001). 
24 In equation (2), FS equals zero as long as its value is less than 10%  
25 We used alternatively employment as weights in equation as in Aitken and Harrison (1999) but the results do not 
change fundamentally.  16 
 
In Figure 5 we present the average values of the horizontal technology spillover variable at the 
two-digit NACE level for the period 2003-2006. Significant variation across sectors is observed. 
The maximum value of the variable is 50% for the motor vehicles (NACE 34) sector, and nearly 
35% for both electrical machinery (NACE 31) and chemicals products (NACE 24) sectors but it 
is below 5% for other five sectors (NACE 17-18-20-22-27). Its value ranges from 50% in motor 
vehicles to 1% in wood products. 
 
Figure 5: Horizontal technology spillover indicator by sector: Average values for 2003 -2006* 
 
* for NACE codes used on the horizontal axis, see Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 6 presents changes in the value of horizontal spillover variable in each sector between 
2003 and 2006.  
 17 
 
Figure 6: Change in Horizontal measure 2003-2006* 
 
* for NACE codes used on the horizontal axis, see Table 1. 
 
Ten sectors registered a rise in the horizontal spillover measure, with three of them experiencing 
a change of more than 38 percentage points and the rest recording a change comprises between 
10 and 3 percentage points. The largest  change was observed in wood products (20 points), 
wearing apparel (18 points) and medical instruments (33 points). 
Control variables 
To isolate the factors other than FDI-related technology spillovers that might affect firm-level 
productivity we use three control variables.
 
 
Foreign share (FSijt) is the share of foreign capital in a firm‟s total equity. It is used to test for the 
existence of a foreign ownership effect on productivity.  
The first one is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration of sales (Herfindahl), which 
measures the degree of concentration of sales in a sector. If a sector has a low concentration ratio 
this may indicate more intense competition between firms and exert a positive effect on their 
productivity level (Javorcik 2004). But a low market share might also impact negatively on R&D 
expenditures, hence on productivity level. To separate the concentration effects from horizontal 18 
 
spillovers  we  added  to  the  model  the  Herfindahl  index  at  the  four-digit  sector  level
26.  It is 
calculated in the following way. 
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The second control variable is related to the scale of the firm. Those firms that produce more than 
the „average‟ firm in the sector, in general, might benefit from scale economies, which might lead 
to higher productivity levels. To account for this factor, an indicator of firm scale defined as a 
firm‟s production divided by the average production volume in its four-digit NACE sector, is 
included in the model. A positive coefficient is expected for this variable. If we denote by N the 












Summary statistics of the variables used are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Obs. Mean Std.  Min. Max. Obs. Mean  Std. Min. Max.
Dev. Dev.
lny 30178 15.47 1.43 8.16 22.34 28689 15.38 1.37 8.16 22.34
lnk 30178 11.76 2.09 0.12 19.34 28689 11.67 2.04 0.12 19.34
lnl 30178 4.27 0.96 3.00 9.19 28689 4.22 0.93 3.00 9.19
lnm 29761 14.79 1.67 0.04 21.91 28292 14.70 1.62 0.04 21.89
lne 29773 11.80 1.76 0.01 18.98 28292 11.73 1.73 0.01 18.98
Foreign Share 30178 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 - - - - -
Scale 30178 1.00 3.35 0.00 183.62 28689 0.87 3.04 0.00 183.62
Herfindahl 30178 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.36 28689 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.36
Horizontal 30178 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.76 28689 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.76
Horizontal_No Res 30178 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.76 28689 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.76
Horizontal_10% ≤ FS ≤ 49% 30178 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13 28689 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.13
Horizontal_50% ≤ FS ≤ 99% 30178 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.53 28689 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.53
Horizontal_10% ≤ FS ≤ 39% 30178 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 28689 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
Horizontal_40% ≤ FS ≤ 69% 30178 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.27 28689 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.27
Horizontal_70% ≤ FS ≤ 99% 30178 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.53 28689 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.53
Horizontal_FS = 100% 30178 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.30 28689 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.30
All Firms Local Firms
 
              Source: Authors‟ calculations from TurkStat‟s SBSS database. 
                                                           
26 This index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the enterprises in a given sector, and its value 
may range from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate a decrease in competition, whereas lower values indicate the opposite. 19 
 
 
Distinction between export-oriented versus domestic market-oriented firms  
As noted in Javorcik (2004), firms that produce for the export market may be benefit less from 
the FDI-related technology spillovers since in general they have few or no relationships with the 
foreign firms operating on the domestic market. To test this hypothesis we estimate our model 
separately on a sample of export-orientated firms where export-orientation is defined as an export 
intensity,  i.e.  firm  exports  divided  by  its  gross  output,  of  50%  or  more.  Domestic  market 
orientation is defined symmetrically as an export intensity of less than 50%. Of course, such an 
assumption  does  not  preclude  that  exporting  firms  might  enjoy  important  technological 
capabilities  to  meet  the  high  standards  of  their  foreign  customers  and  that  technology  and 
knowledge transfers might occur from these customers to them. 
 
4) Estimation method and analysis of findings 
 
4a) Econometric Estimation 
We have a firm-level unbalanced panel dataset comprised of 37,008 observations over the period 
2003-2006.  We  have  the  choice  between  the  fixed  effect  (FE)  and  the  random  effect  (RE) 
methods  in  the  estimation  of  equation  (2)  in  order  to  overcome  a  possible  bias  due  to  an 
unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effect which is included among explanatory variables. 
Indeed, in equation (2) the error term єijt can be decomposed into two elements єijt=ui + vijt: Here, 
ui accounts for any unobservable time-invariant firm-specific effect (high quality management, 
for instance) not included in the regression but correlated with firm productivity. As to vijt , it 
varies over firms, sectors and time and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance σv
2. This last term is assumed not to be correlated across firms, sectors, or time. If the 
OLS method is used for estimation, this might preclude us from taking into account a possible 
unobservable heterogeneity problem, which will lead to a heterogeneity bias. The FE model will 
produce consistent estimates in the presence of other variables not included in the model but 
affecting firm‟s productivity and correlated with the independent variables. On the other hand 
using  the  RE  model  will  produce  biased  estimates  since  it  is  assumed  that  error  term  is 
uncorrelated with the regressors (Verbeek, 2008). Also to discriminate between fixed and random 20 
 
effects models, we carried out the Haussmann test, which opted always in favor of the FE model. 
We also included a full set of year and sector dummies at the four-digit sector level (192) in 
equation  (2)  to  account  for  the  effect  of  common  macroeconomic  shocks  and  sector-level 
peculiarities on output growth. 
 
We estimate our model alternatively on two samples: the first one with all the firms and the 
second one with only local firms so as to isolate a possible spillover effect on domestic firms. We 
also  corrected  standard  errors  for  clustering  within  firms,  as  Moulton  (1990)  shows  that 
regressions performed on micro units with aggregated sector variables lead to serious downward 
bias in the errors. Finally, we ran two models alternatively for export-oriented firms and domestic 
market-oriented firms for the reasons mentioned above. 
 
4b) Analysis of findings 
 
Estimation  results  are  presented  Table  4.  The  dependent  variable  is  measured  as  the  natural 
logarithm of the firm-level real gross output. First two columns report the results for the full 
sample and the sample of local firms, respectively. Fourth column pertains to export-orientated 
firms and the fifth one to domestic market-orientated firms. 21 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of firm-level output growth 











lnk 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011* 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
lnl 0.316*** 0.314*** 0.254*** 0.316***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.016)
lnm 0.277*** 0.276*** 0.312*** 0.263***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.033) (0.015)
lne 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.053***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Foreign Share 0.034 -0.053 0.069
(0.041) (0.090) (0.047)
Scale 0.164*** 0.173*** 0.123*** 0.175***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025)
Herfindahl -0.277* -0.288* 0.039 -0.299*
(0.121) (0.131) (0.386) (0.136)
Horizontal 0.357*** 0.374*** 0.430* 0.366***
(0.058) (0.062) (0.212) (0.063)
Constant 9.749*** 9.633*** 8.820*** 9.868***
(0.282) (0.275) (0.474) (0.315)
Observations 29388 27927 4652 24736
Number of Firms 7690 7390 1911 7147
Prob > F 467.16 413.32 40.37 143.67
R2 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58  
All regressions include year and sector dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for clustering for each firm 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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First, we will examine estimation results for the first two models (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4). 
As expected, coefficients associated with the inputs are all positive and significant at the 0.1% 
significance  level.  The  coefficients  associated  with  two  control  variables  are  statistically 
significant. A unit increase in our firm scale indicator increases firm gross output by 0.16 %, an 
effect which is significant at 0.01 % level. Ceteris paribus, the degree of concentration of sales at 
the four digit-industry level tends to influence negatively firm output through its impact on frms‟ 
total factor productivity
27 but this impact is significant only at the 5% level. On the other hand, 
coefficient on the foreign ownership variable is not significant in the model including domestic as 
well as foreign firms. Contrarily to many existing studies which find a positive and significant 
effect for this variable, this finding may be explained by the fact that once other characteristics of 
foreign firms correlated with their ownership structure have been already taken into account  – as 
this is the case of our paper – this ownership effect disappears
28. 
 
As to the variable of interest, the indicator of FDI -related horizontal technology spillovers, it 
exerts a positive and statistically significant  -at the 0.01 % level - effect output growth.  The 
estimate of the associated coefficient is larger with the sample of local firms (0.37) than with the 
sample comprising all firms (0.36) but the difference is negligible . The first coefficient implies 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the horizontal spillover indicator  – which is roughly the 
share of sector-level gross output achieved by foreign firms – is associated with a 0.37 percent 
increase in the gross output of local firms. Hence, our findings point to the existence of positive 
horizontal  technology  spillovers  accruing  from  foreign  to  domestic  firms  in  the  Turkish 
manufacturing industry over the period 2003-2006. The econometric findings do not, however, 
enable us to disentangle the relative importance of different phenomena at the origin of the this 
positive and significant impact – it might be due to demonstration effects, competition effects, or 
to mobility of labor from foreign to domestic firms – or to any combination of them. 
 
When estimation is performed on the sample of export- and domestic market-orientated firms 
(column  3  and  4  in  Table  4),  regression  results  do  not  change  very  much.  Two  significant 
changes occur with respect to results reported in the first column of Table 4. First, the indicator of 
                                                           
27 The term ln A in equation (2). 
28 Taymaz and Ozler (2007) confirm this assertion  in their study of the Turkish manufacturing sector over 1983 -
2001. 23 
 
concentration is no more significant at the 5 % level for export-oriented firms while it remains 
significant  for domestic market-oriented firms  –this is an expected result since this indicator 
measures  the  degree  of  sales  concentration  on  the  domestic  market.  More  important  for  the 
purpose of this study is the coefficient of the horizontal spillover variable, which is positive in 
both cases but now the level of significance differs: this impact is significant at the 0.01 % level 
for the domestic orientated firms while its level of significance is 5 % for export-oriented firms 
Therefore, these results tend to show that firms producing for the domestic market have benefited 
more intensively from the foreign presence in their sector compared to export-oriented firms 
through channels such as demonstration, competition or labor turnover effects.  
 
Estimation results in Table 4 point to the existence and positive effects of FDI-based horizontal 
spillovers on output growth of domestic firms. Next, we use a number of alternative indicators for 
FDI-related horizontal technology spillovers and verify whether regressions results are robust to 
the indicator adopted. Indeed, a number of studies confirm that the degree of foreign ownership 
may be an important factor for the generation of horizontal spillovers
29. For instance, the more 
modern and complex the technology, the more TNCs prefer to transfer it to an affiliate rather than 
to a third party by fear of losing its control. The risk of leakages of its intangible assets to a 
domestic partner will  increase with the degree of involvement of the domestic partner in the 
partnership
30.  
Since the degree of involvement of the foreign partner in the firm can be measured by its share in 
total equity, four different measures of foreign participation are used here
31. The first one does 
not impose any  restriction on foreign share   (FS>0)  while  the second one is the indicator 
previously used in our study, i.e. with the share of foreign partner in total equity being equal to at 
least 10% (FS>10). Next, to analyze the impact of minority- and majority-owned joint ventures 
on spillovers, firms are categorized according to whether foreign share in equity is between 10% 
and 50% (10<FS<50), higher than 50% but less than 100% (50<FS<100) and finally whether full 
foreign ownership  is observed  (FS=100). Lastly,  we divide foreign firms into four groups; 
foreign share between 10% and 39.9%, between 40% and 69.9%, between 70% and 99.9%, and  
                                                           
29 For instance, see Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999). 
30 Of course, other factors such as the absorptive capacity of local agents and the type of market aimed at by MNCs 
will influence the quantity and quality of technology transferred to the host country. See Kumar (1998). 
31See Taymaz and Yilmaz (2008). 24 
 
Table 5: Determinants of firm-level output growth with different spillover variables (1) 
(Fixed effect estimation over 2003-2006) 
lnk 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnl 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.314***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
lnm 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.276***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
lne 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Scale 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Herfindahl -0.278* -0.278* -0.299* -0.301* -0.287* -0.288* -0.306* -0.308*
(0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132)
Horizontal (FS > 0%) 0.363*** 0.375***
(0.058) (0.062)
Horizontal_ 0.362*** 0.374***
FS ≥ 10% (0.058) (0.062)
Horizontal_ -0.092 -0.216
10% ≤ FS ≤ 49% (0.245) (0.288)
Horizontal_ 0.338*** 0.355***
50% ≤ FS ≤ 99% (0.063) (0.067)
Horizontal_ 0.374 0.365
10%  ≤ FS  ≤39% (0.296) (0.315)
Horizontal_ 0.135 0.137
40% ≤ FS ≤ 69% (0.136) (0.147)
Horizontal_ 0.360*** 0.380***
70% ≤  FS ≤ 99% (0.067) (0.071)
Horizontal_ 0.403*** 0.422*** 0.410*** 0.432***
FS=100% (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068)
Constant 9.745*** 9.748*** 8.406*** 8.415*** 9.630*** 9.633*** 9.664*** 9.643***
(0.282) (0.282) (0.200) (0.200) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275)
Observations 29388 29388 29388 29388 27927 27927 27927 27927
Number of Firms 7690 7690 7690 7690 7390 7390 7390 7390
Prob > F 470.64 469.48 319.66 1023 619.45 413.32 333.03 744
R2 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
All Firms Local Firms
 
All regressions include year  and sector dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for clustering for each firm 




FS equal to 100%. We constructed different sector-level horizontal spillover indicators for each 
firm-specific foreign share variable and added them to equation (2). Different specifications of 
the original model are estimated using fixed effect methods for the entire sample of all firms, for 
local firms, for export- and domestic market- oriented firms. Estimation results are presented in 
Table 5 separately for all firms and for domestic firms only. 
 
For all the models reported in Table 5, coefficient estimates obtained for the scale variable, the 
indicator of concentration and for input variables are qualitatively similar to those presented is 
Table 4
32. Of more interest here are the estimates obtained for the different horizontal spillover 
indicators introduced in equation (2). The results for the first two spillover indicators point to a 
positive and significant impact on output growth, as could be expected from the findings in Table 
4.  The  most  striking  result  concerns, however, the respective  impact s  of  minority-  versus 
majority-owned  joint  ventures  by  foreign  capital.  We  were  unable  to  find  any  statistically 
significant  impact  of  horizontal  spillovers  associated  with  minority  joint  ventures,  however 
defined  (foreign  share  less  than  %50  or  40%).  On  the  other  hand  we  found  positive  and 
significant estimates for spillover indicators associated with majority joint ventures (foreign share 
higher than 49% or 69%) and with full foreign ownership control (foreign share equals 100%). In 
addition, the size of coefficients associated with these spillover indicators is larger the larger the 
foreign share in firm equity and it is maximal in the case of full foreign ownership. In other 
terms, there is a positive relationship between the extent of foreign ownership at the firm level 
and the horizontal spillovers to which it leads. These findings do not change among the two 
samples on which regressions are run – i.e. all firms and only domestic firms. 
 
Therefore, although foreign firms may try to minimize the leakage of their proprietary intangible 
assets  toward  their  domestic  partners  in  the  host  country  by  participation  to  capital  in  joint 
ventures,  this  leakage  or  involuntary  diffusion  of  their  assets  occurs  all  the  same.  And  our 
findings show that the recipients of these spillovers are domestic firms operating in the same 
sector activity as foreign firms – i.e. their competitors. An unexpected policy implication of this 
finding is that governments should not always intervene in order to increase the capital share of a  
                                                           
32 We derived different firm-level FS variables for each spillover category and added them to the models in Table 5. 
We could not find, however, any significant correlation between the FS variables and output growth, so we did not 
include these firm-specific FS variables in the models. 26 
 
Table 6: Determinants of firm-level output growth with different spillover variables (2) 
(Fixed effect estimation over 2003-2006) 
lnk 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnl 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.316***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
lnm 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.310*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
lne 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Scale 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Herfindahl 0.043 0.040 0.037 0.040 -0.300* -0.301* -0.328* -0.331*
(0.386) (0.386) (0.387) (0.387) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137)
Horizontal (FS > 0%) 0.429* 0.376***
(0.216) (0.063)
Horizontal_ 0.415 0.375***
FS ≥ 10% (0.216) (0.063)
Horizontal_ 0.182 -0.215
10% ≤ FS ≤ 49% (0.710) (0.271)
Horizontal_ 0.340 0.361***
50% ≤ FS ≤ 99% (0.241) (0.067)
Horizontal_ -1.935 0.459
10%  ≤ FS  ≤39% (1.193) (0.313)
Horizontal_ 0.465 0.100
40% ≤ FS ≤ 69% (0.317) (0.149)
Horizontal_ 0.398 0.389***
70% ≤  FS ≤ 99% (0.275) (0.070)
Horizontal_ 0.568* 0.598* 0.406*** 0.430***
FS=100% (0.256) (0.267) (0.067) (0.068)
Constant 8.881*** 8.825*** 8.894*** 8.920*** 9.865*** 9.591*** 9.334*** 9.884***
(0.473) (0.474) (0.473) (0.474) (0.315) (0.239) (0.241) (0.315)
Observations 4652 4652 4652 4652 24736 24736 24736 24736
Number of Firms 1911 1911 1911 1911 7147 7147 7147 7147
Prob > F 42.12 42.11 38.85 37.67 123.76 122.68 196.90 98.90
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Export Orientated Firms Domestic  Orientated Firms
 
All regressions include year and sector dummies  
Robust standard errors in parentheses corrected for clustering for each firm 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
 27 
 
local partner in a joint venture. This might be accompanied by a less important – quantitatively or 
qualitatively – transfer of technology to the host country by foreign firms which could reduce the 
positive spillover or simply suppress it. The fact that the magnitude of the spillover effect is the 
most important in the case of full foreign ownership supports this view. 
 
Table 6 shows regression results when estimation is performed alternatively on the sample of 
export- and domestic-orientated firms. Estimation results pertaining to  the scale variable, the 
indicator of sales concentration and to input variables are qualitatively similar to those obtained 
previously in Table 4.  
 
As for the impact of different spillover indicators on the output growth of export orientated firms, 
a positive and significant coefficient is obtained – albeit at a 5% significance level – only for the 
one based on full foreign ownership. In other terms, firms operating in the Turkish manufacturing 
sector but oriented toward export markets do benefit from FDI-related spillovers stemming from 
their  sector of activity  only  when  the foreign  share  in capital  attains  100 %.  In the case of 
domestic-orientated firms, regression results confirm our previous findings: we could not find 
any significant effect of horizontal spillovers on output growth for minority-owned joint ventures 
(less than %50 or 69) but we found positive and significant coefficients on horizontal spillovers 
for  majority  joint  venture  (higher  than  50%  or  70%)  and  for  full  foreign  ownership  control 
(100%).  
 
4.  Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
 
In this chapter we carried out an econometric analysis to test for the presence of FDI-related 
intra-industry technology spillovers in the Turkish manufacturing industry over 2003-2006. We 
used a firm-level unbalanced panel dataset involving about 30 000 observations and a production 
function was estimated to this end. To the best of our knowledge this is the first econometric 
study on FDI-related spillovers in the Turkish manufacturing sector using firm-level data for the 
post 2001 period.  
 
Our findings suggest that there are horizontal technology spillovers accruing from foreign to local 
manufacturing firms that operate in the same four-digit industry over 2003-2006. These spillovers 28 
 
impact positively on firm-level output growth through their positive effect on the evolution of 
total  factor  productivity.  This  finding  is  in  contrast  to  those  of  earlier  studies  on  Turkish 
manufacturing industry on the same issue which found either a negative significant or a non-
significant effect of FDI-related spillovers on firm performance. On the other hand compared to 
firms oriented toward the domestic market, linkages of export-orientated manufacturing firms 
with  foreign  firms  operating  in  Turkey  seem  to  be  rather  weak,  resulting  in  a  statistically 
insignificant impact of FDI-related spillovers on their productivity and growth rates.  
 
The aforementioned finding as to the existence of a positive impact of FDI spillovers on firm 
output – through its impact on productivity – was obtained by adopting a very broad definition of 
foreign ownership, i.e. by considering as „foreign‟ all those firms with at least 10 % of their 
capital owned by foreign agents. Next, we estimated our model by adopting different definitions 
of ownership mainly to distinguish between minority- and majority-owned firms by foreigners. 
The most striking result of our study is that we could not find any significant coefficient for the 
horizontal spillover indicators associated with minority joint ventures. However, we uncovered a 
positive and significant effect for horizontal spillovers related with majority joint ventures and 
with firms under full foreign ownership control. In other terms, firms with majority or full foreign 
ownership seem to be at the origin of intra-industry technology spillovers while minority-owned 
foreign firms do not.  
 
Although a domestic share in firm capital higher than that of the foreign partner may reduce the 
volume and the quality of technology transfer which benefits to the domestic partner in a joint 
venture, this negative effect in our case is more than compensated by unintended technology 
transfers  occurring  to  domestic  firms  operating  in  the  same  industry.  The  immediate  policy 
implication  of  this  finding  is  that  governments  should  abstain  from  intervening  in  order  to 
increase the share of domestic partners in joint ventures. When we distinguish between different 
degrees of foreign ownership and spillovers associated with them, there is evidence that export-
oriented firms under full foreign control do benefit from FDI-based technology spillovers. 
 
The findings of this study point to a number of problems when it comes to identify the effects of 
FDI spillovers but also suggest a number of directions into which research can be extended. 29 
 
 
Firstly, the econometric investigation conducted in this chapter should be repeated once more 
recent firm data become available. This is all the more necessary since it may take a long time for 
FDI-spillovers to produce their final impact and since the findings of previous studies on FDI-
spillovers pertaining to the pre-2001 period in Turkey are different from the ones obtained here.  
 
Secondly, one can and should go one step further and investigate the existence of vertical FDI-
related spillovers and their impact on the performance of domestic suppliers and customers of 
foreign firms
33. The horizontal vs. vertical FDI-spillovers issue is an important one since some 
researchers maintain that searching for horizontal spillovers is equivalent to looking into wrong 
direction and that it is likely that only vertical FDI spillovers do exist
34. This affirmation might 
have a solid base  because of the unintended nature of  technology transfers in the case of 
horizontal spillovers while transfers involving vertical spillovers –also called linkages– might be 
in the interest of both parties. 
 
Finally, although findings of econometric studies have the benefit of generalization they act very 
often as a black box, not enabling to uncover the mechanisms behind the results obtained. For 
instance, in our case it is difficult to establish whether demonstration or competition effects, or 
labor  mobility  are  behind  the  positive  spillover  effect  obtained.  The  same  remark  would  be 
pertain  to  a  study  testing  the  existence  of  vertical  FDI  spillovers  Case  studies  pertaining  to 
particular  firms  or  field  research  oriented  at  several  firms  through  questionnaires  should  be 
carried out to uncover what causes such effects or lack of it
35. 
 
In any case the increase observed in FDI flows towards emerging economies, the major role of 
MNCs in the transfer of technologies, in general and the few studies conducted for the Turkish 
economy where the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP  has increased since the early 2000s – none for 
the post-2001 period to our knowledge – in particular, point to the importance of conducting 
other studies such as this one for the Turkish economy.  
                                                           
33 Lenger &Taymaz (2006) use sector-level data while Taymaz &Yilmaz (2008) use firm-level data to implement 
such a study for the pre-2001 period in the Turkish manufacturing sector. 
34 For instance, see Javorcik (2004). 
35 For instance, see Pamukçu &S￶nmez (2011) for such a field study in the case of the Turkish automobile industry. 30 
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